[no description] https://upleb.uk/npub1q9geyrch3feyczz242sxjaa05yczv50dlpug082sjln2kl0wrnxst0nrfa/bitflash/atom?h=main 2026-09-03T21:49:35+00:00 2026-09-03T21:49:35+00:00 bitflash-maintainer noreply@bitflash.invalid 2026-09-03T21:49:35+00:00 urn:sha1:ea8fe94658bf20d2b669b619231238f12e6bd8fc 2026-09-02T17:39:50+00:00 bitflash-maintainer noreply@bitflash.invalid 2026-09-02T17:39:50+00:00 urn:sha1:0a8c445742ce871c6b9352bf406d2232a6fd3134 PumpIn's wrapper closed pumpEnd and the rendezvous socket the moment it exited, without waiting for PumpOut, which then called shutdown() on both at its own exit. Which of the two got there first decided whether that shutdown addressed a live descriptor or a number the kernel had already handed back out -- in which case it tears down an unrelated connection. The inbound pump wins that race whenever the rendezvous socket dies before the app socket, which is the ordinary shape of a relay restart or a far side hanging up. The failure path added in 0b566b4 has the same hole. Its catch shuts down rv to wake an inbound pump it assumes is parked in RvReadN. PumpIn does not park when the rendezvous connection is already dead: it returns on its first length read and its wrapper closes both descriptors. A refused pthread_create and a dead rv are not independent -- both are symptoms of a loaded process -- so that is the likely case, not the exotic one. Both descriptors now belong to a shared_ptr the two pumps hold for the whole of their bodies, so the close happens after the last pump has stopped touching them and no shutdown can precede it. appEnd is unchanged: the caller gets it on success, StartTunnel closes it on every failure path, no pump ever touches it. 0b566b4's message says of that catch that "closing those descriptors from the failure path instead would race it". True as far as it goes, but it reads as though what the code did instead was safe, and it was not -- the shutdown raced the same close. There was no ordering there to prefer, only a missing owner. Measured against the real code with the relay in a separate process, every close() and shutdown() traced and pthread_create refused on demand: normal teardown, 25 tunnels 29 shutdowns on a closed fd -> 0 refused outbound spawn, 25 25 shutdowns on a closed fd -> 0 Close counts are identical before and after (8 and 5 per tunnel, every one accounted for) and live descriptors return to their starting count, so the defect was only ever the ordering, never a leak or a double close. 2026-09-02T09:03:01+00:00 bitflash-maintainer noreply@bitflash.invalid 2026-09-02T09:03:01+00:00 urn:sha1:7c70eb4498e88725241493033edfe89554ff1b18 2026-09-02T07:09:45+00:00 bitflash-maintainer noreply@bitflash.invalid 2026-09-02T07:09:45+00:00 urn:sha1:0b566b4869b9e86c90162befd87f9882b6dd143c std::thread throws std::system_error when pthread_create is refused (RLIMIT_NPROC, a container's pids cgroup, memory pressure), and nothing caught it, so the node died by std::terminate. Threads are spawned per peer connection, so the pressure that triggers this scales with peer count, which is attacker-influenced. Observed killing a healthy participant worker mid-mining. Every spawn site in the node build, and what a failure now does: - btftunnel.cpp: both tunnel pumps are guarded. The inbound pump starts first because it owns cleanup of the pump end and rendezvous socket; if the second spawn is refused, shutdown() wakes the first out of its read and it cleans up itself -- closing those descriptors from the failure path instead would race it onto reused descriptors. Both paths return INVALID_SOCKET, which every caller already treats as "this connection failed". - btfrv.cpp: the relay's accept loop drops the connection it cannot serve and stops accepting for a moment -- longer after consecutive failures, capped at 5s -- instead of dying at an arbitrary one. The per-pair second pump now runs on the handling thread itself, leaving exactly one spawn to guard and nothing running yet to race. - main.cpp: a participant that cannot spawn its hash workers stops the ones that did start, drops the pool connection, and returns to the reconnect loop, the same way an ordinary disconnect does. - randomx_pow.cpp: dataset init joins the workers it got, releases the dataset, and stays in light mode -- the same trade the allocation failure path above it already makes. - rpc.cpp, net.cpp: the remaining unchecked _beginthread calls (which report failure by value, they cannot throw) now say precisely what did not start. The pool's accept and payout threads failing silently left the pool running deaf -- nobody accepts, nobody gets paid, and nothing in the log says why. Left alone deliberately: the per-relay accept spawns (rpc.cpp) already check, log and retry on the next poll; startup-critical spawns in net.cpp keep failing hard; the selftest-only std::thread uses may abort a selftest run, which is acceptable where dying over one peer is not. Verified: full node rebuilds clean and links; pool-stratum selftest passes; a scratch harness under RLIMIT_NPROC=1 confirms _beginthread reports -1 and std::thread throws system_error, the premises of every path above. 2026-08-01T16:10:23+00:00 Bitflash btf01@proton.me 2026-08-01T16:10:23+00:00 urn:sha1:21c8bb63cb85f3001ddee9237b1d7e689675d293 A node was found holding 1502 sockets in Windows bound state, one ephemeral port each, 9% of the machine range in nineteen hours. Reading the code did not find it: every connect() failure path here closes its socket. So count. Every socket is tagged at creation and untagged at close, across all ten sites, with a counter for closes that fail. Already rules out three explanations: nothing is created or closed behind the counter (untagged closes are zero), no close is failing, and the leaked sockets are not in the live set -- tracked live matches what the OS reports as established, while the bound pile is something the program already closed successfully. 2026-07-24T14:18:11+00:00 Bitflash-sh btf01@proton.me 2026-07-24T14:18:11+00:00 urn:sha1:51d617e70f90a972185917ea0096c1ecef2bfa8b Satoshi's bitcoin-0.1.0 reborn with RandomX CPU proof of work, anonymous .btf addressing over Nostr with CGNAT rendezvous, automatic peer discovery, a headless Linux node, and Windows GUI wallet. Fair launch, no premine, 21M cap.