npub1q9geyrch3feyczz242sxjaa05yczv50dlpug082sjln2kl0wrnxst0nrfa/bitflash/src/net.cpp, branch main

Merge upstream/main into the fork

2026-09-05T05:08:30+00:00

Brings the nine commits that are actually the latest on our lineage: isolated testnet parameters and genesis, optional 2 MB large pages for RandomX, and five README changes. This is what "up to date" means here -- not the 1.2.2x tags, which carry higher version numbers but were cut 2026-07-30, three weeks before the line we ship, and which upstream/main does not contain. Three conflicts, all resolved toward upstream's structure while keeping what this fork knows: main.cpp -- upstream moved genesis construction into BuildGenesisBlock() so mainnet and the new testnet can share it. Verified byte-for-byte before taking it: MAINNET_GENESIS_TIMESTAMP, _TIME (1753315200), _NONCE (3141), _HASH, _MERKLE, the scriptPubKey, nBits and nVersion all equal what this tree built inline. The mainnet genesis hash is unchanged and the asserts still guard it. Kept our warning about never editing those inputs, and kept our note that 1753315200 is 2025-07-24, not 2026 -- upstream's comment on that constant states the wrong year. net.h -- DEFAULT_PORT = htons(8433) becomes MAINNET_PORT/TESTNET_PORT in host order. Nothing is lost: net.cpp's GetDefaultPort() applies htons() itself and is what every caller uses, so the value reaching a sockaddr is unchanged and mainnet stays on 8433. selftest.cpp -- the known-tests string had diverged in both directions. Took the union: upstream's network-params alongside our payout-ledger, rather than dropping either. Gates: 15/15 selftests (our 14 plus upstream's network-params), consensus constants unchanged against e4f898c except the pre-existing MAX_BLOCK_SIZE_GEN, mainnet genesis intact, compactblock's 17 checks still pass, money-log check ok, GNU_STACK RW.

merge: upstream 1.2.20 into deploy/all-2026-08-24

2026-09-03T22:33:20+00:00

# Conflicts: # Makefile

net: a refused thread spawn drops one peer, not the node

2026-09-02T07:09:45+00:00

std::thread throws std::system_error when pthread_create is refused (RLIMIT_NPROC, a container's pids cgroup, memory pressure), and nothing caught it, so the node died by std::terminate. Threads are spawned per peer connection, so the pressure that triggers this scales with peer count, which is attacker-influenced. Observed killing a healthy participant worker mid-mining. Every spawn site in the node build, and what a failure now does: - btftunnel.cpp: both tunnel pumps are guarded. The inbound pump starts first because it owns cleanup of the pump end and rendezvous socket; if the second spawn is refused, shutdown() wakes the first out of its read and it cleans up itself -- closing those descriptors from the failure path instead would race it onto reused descriptors. Both paths return INVALID_SOCKET, which every caller already treats as "this connection failed". - btfrv.cpp: the relay's accept loop drops the connection it cannot serve and stops accepting for a moment -- longer after consecutive failures, capped at 5s -- instead of dying at an arbitrary one. The per-pair second pump now runs on the handling thread itself, leaving exactly one spawn to guard and nothing running yet to race. - main.cpp: a participant that cannot spawn its hash workers stops the ones that did start, drops the pool connection, and returns to the reconnect loop, the same way an ordinary disconnect does. - randomx_pow.cpp: dataset init joins the workers it got, releases the dataset, and stays in light mode -- the same trade the allocation failure path above it already makes. - rpc.cpp, net.cpp: the remaining unchecked _beginthread calls (which report failure by value, they cannot throw) now say precisely what did not start. The pool's accept and payout threads failing silently left the pool running deaf -- nobody accepts, nobody gets paid, and nothing in the log says why. Left alone deliberately: the per-relay accept spawns (rpc.cpp) already check, log and retry on the next poll; startup-critical spawns in net.cpp keep failing hard; the selftest-only std::thread uses may abort a selftest run, which is acceptable where dying over one peer is not. Verified: full node rebuilds clean and links; pool-stratum selftest passes; a scratch harness under RLIMIT_NPROC=1 confirms _beginthread reports -1 and std::thread throws system_error, the premises of every path above.

Merge upstream v1.2.20 into the fork

2026-09-01T17:14:12+00:00

Merges upstream tag v1.2.20 (6aa3dade) into our 1.2.19+sec tree. The merge base is bc3de30's descendant 9e39a50 -- upstream's own v1.2.19 -- so this is an ordinary three-way merge, not a replay. Five conflict blocks in four files, all resolved below. No consensus change. CheckBlock, ConnectBlock, DisconnectBlock, ConnectInputs, AcceptBlock, AcceptTransaction, GetNextWorkRequired and GetBlockValue hash identical to v1.2.19; script.cpp and script.h are byte-identical on both sides. main.cpp is +3 lines and main.h +2, all wallet-backend plumbing. rpc.cpp is untouched, so the payout ledger arrives unchanged. Makefile, VERSION. OURS, renumbered. 1.2.20+sec, for the same reason 1.2.19 carried +sec: this tree is not the upstream release of that number and the string names every release artifact. Makefile, AppImage recipe. OURS for the AppDir path, THEIRS for the bundled library. Upstream's hunk reverts the icon paths to a hardcoded /tmp/bitflash.AppDir, which is the local-user pre-placement hazard the fork moved out of /tmp in the first place; taking their side wholesale would have reintroduced it silently, inside a conflict about something else. The AppDir stays $(APPDIR), and libsqlite3.so.0 joins the bundled list, which the new backend genuinely needs. src/Makefile, src/makefile.mingw, HEADERS. BOTH. Ours drops market.h, theirs adds wallet_sqlite.h; the resolution does both. NODE_OBJS auto-merged correctly in both files -- obj/wallet_sqlite.o present, obj/market.o still gone -- and was verified rather than assumed, because that line has trapped this fork before. src/selftest.cpp, known-tests list. BOTH, union. Upstream adds eight wallet-storage tests, we keep payout-ledger. The dispatch chain itself auto-merged and still routes payout-ledger to RunPayoutLedgerSelfTest. Hardening verified intact after merge: the TLS 1.2 floor in nostr.cpp, the /rvrelay pin, opt-in managed Tor, strict sig3-on-onion descriptor verification, and the marketplace removal. Upstream shipped no build logs or __pycache__ this time; the three added files are docs/storage.md and src/wallet_sqlite.{cpp,h}. The SQLite backend this release introduces is NOT enabled here. An existing wallet.dat resolves to Berkeley DB on every branch of the new selection logic, and the conversion wizard is GUI-only and not compiled into the headless node. The review findings that gate ever turning it on -- the non-atomic backend marker, the connection-wide WriteHDMaster transaction, and the encrypt-swap crash window -- are recorded on the tracker, not fixed here.

net: bind INADDR_ANY only when this node advertises an onion endpoint

2026-08-26T22:44:31+00:00

Upstream 1.2.19 made the P2P listener wildcard-bind unconditionally because managed Tor forwards hidden-service traffic to 127.0.0.1, which a LAN-only bind cannot receive. That also widened every non-Tor node to listen on VPN tunnels, docker bridges and secondary NICs. The onion endpoint is always configured (or the managed-Tor hidden service established) before StartNode, so the predicate is ready when the bind happens.

Merge upstream v1.2.19 into the fork

2026-08-26T22:41:53+00:00

Merges upstream tag v1.2.19 (9e39a50) into merge/upstream-1.2.18 (991853f). Unlike the 1.2.15->1.2.18 replay, bc3de30 is a true ancestor of our branch via a9b4f89, so this is an ordinary three-way merge with merge-base bc3de30. Delta: 36 files, +3265/-163, the Tor onion transport (managed Tor, signed direct onion endpoints, onion-only dial mode) and the nHDNext restore fix. src/main.cpp, main.h, script.cpp/h and db.cpp/h are byte-identical between the two tags, and the poll() socket loop carries no diff hunks, so the merge is consensus-neutral and the soak-tested socket paths are unchanged. relay/ is untouched; the payout ledger (rpc.cpp) is untouched. 7 conflict blocks in 6 files, resolved as follows. Makefile -- VERSION. Ours: stays 1.2.19+sec with the naming comment updated, so artifacts from this tree cannot be mistaken for the upstream release. src/Makefile, src/makefile.mingw -- HEADERS list. Ours (no market.h) plus their tor.h. NODE_OBJS auto-merged correctly: no market.o, tor.o present. src/selftest.cpp -- known-tests list. Union: payout-ledger (ours) and managed-tor (theirs). src/main_gui.cpp -- one block. Our /dumpaddresses kept; their BtfStopManagedTor() on the StartNode failure path taken. The /rvrelay pin, /noannounce and the marketplace removal auto-merged and were verified intact. src/nostr.cpp -- two blocks in ResolveDescriptor. Signature takes both out-params (our fExchangeOk, their rawOut). The body keeps our drain-to-EOSE read -- returning early poisons the pooled socket for the next caller -- and adds their rawOut capture. Our TLS 1.2 floor (SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version) is untouched by this merge; upstream 1.2.19 still has no floor of its own. Upstream's release commit also added four build logs and a compiled Python cache (build-1219.log, build-17.log, build-appimage.log, build-node.log, scripts/__pycache__/bitflash_chain.cpython-313.pyc). Removed here; they are build output, not source.

Merge upstream v1.2.18 into the fork

2026-08-23T05:21:31+00:00

Merges upstream tag v1.2.18 (bc3de30) into our 24 commits. The merge base is a259215, upstream's own commit, whose src/ tree is byte-identical to 68de575 -- our commits were replayed onto a259215 first so that git had a real base to work from. That produced 28 conflict hunks in 9 files instead of the 21 conflict events / 51 hunks a direct cherry-pick onto the tag would have forced, most of which were artifacts of lifting our commits away from their own predecessors. No consensus change. main.cpp's GetBlockValue, GetNextWorkRequired, ConnectInputs, ConnectBlock, CheckBlock, AcceptBlock and AcceptTransaction are untouched by this merge; script.cpp, serialize.h and randomx_pow.h are identical on both sides. The frozen-chain oracle reproduces the pinned UTXO root 116a2b6b... byte for byte, and the merged binary loads the same 12,586-block chain to the same tip aac622f0a3b2f8... with all blocks re-verified and none rejected. Which side won, per file and per hunk. src/rpc.cpp -- 15 hunks. 1. RebuildJob transaction selection. THEIRS for the multi-pass loop and the nFees fix, OURS for the cap. Their vfAlreadyAdded/fFoundSomething loop lands dependent transactions that our single pass dropped deterministically, and their nFees is accumulated across the scan instead of being redeclared inside it -- ours passed a hardcoded 0 to GetBlockValue, so every pool block built here discarded its fees. But their bound is MAX_SIZE/2 = 16 MB, and MAX_BLOCK_SIZE is 1 MB, so their template can exceed what their own CheckBlock accepts. Cap kept at MAX_BLOCK_SIZE/2, with our inner break so a single pass cannot overshoot by more than one transaction. Our RebuildJob sync gating and deaf-node detection are kept; upstream has none. 2. struct PendingPayout. OURS for the key, THEIRS for paidTxids. Their id is the string "block-", which is height keying -- the exact bug 44849e6 fixed after a 280-block reorg left ~14.4k BTF owed against blocks that no longer existed. Height keying also lets the crash-recovery probe match the previous round's transaction after a reorg and silently skip a miner, so their id is dropped entirely and blockHash stays the key. paidTxids is taken because it is what makes an entry survivable. Their nextAttempt and our retryAfter are the same concept under two names; ours is kept and theirs dropped. matureAtHeight gained an explicit = 0, which neither side had in our style of initialiser. 3./4. Ledger writer and loader. Mechanical follow-ons of 2. The loader keeps ours and takes their tolerance for an entry with no usable height, guarded so it cannot fire on a well-formed entry. One redundancy was removed rather than merged: their unguarded `if (obj.contains("blockHeight")) get()` sat two lines above our is_number-guarded version, and an unguarded get() on a malformed value throws out of the whole loop, losing every entry in the file. Verified against the live production pending_payouts.json (2 entries, keys amounts/blockHash/blockHeight/matureAtHeight): loads both. A file in the new shape, with retryAfter and paidTxids, also loads. 5. Insertion point after the loader. BOTH. Our PayingRecord/gPaying in-flight ledger and their PoolRoundProof/PoolRoundToJson are disjoint features that landed at the same offset. Both kept, in full. 6. Writer tail. THEIRS, copied into our writer. Checking fclose() matters here because fclose is where the buffered write actually reaches the OS: renaming a short .tmp over a good file is precisely the truncation the atomic write exists to prevent. The Windows remove()-before-rename() is required because rename() there will not replace an existing file. 7. Loader bodies. BOTH -- LoadPaying and LoadPoolRounds are different functions that happened to share a common tail. 8. Function block, 111 vs 36 lines. BOTH, with one deliberate deletion. PayoutBlockStillOnChain, PayoutComment, RecordPoolRound, MarkPoolRoundPaid all kept. WalletAlreadyPaid is DELETED and ReconcilePayouts rewritten, because our reconciliation and their FindRecordedPoolPayout are two answers to the same crash-recovery question and running both would give the same debt two authorities. Their wallet probe wins: it matches structured metadata rather than a comment string, so it can tell two rounds paying the same address the same amount apart. ReconcilePayouts keeps only the job that is still real -- dropping in-flight records the ledger already shows paid, and arming each restored record for its one wallet probe. It no longer touches gPendingPayouts at all; under the new model dropping ledger entries there would reintroduce the loss this merge adopts their model to prevent. Their gPayoutExecMutex/gPayoutThreadRunning re-declarations were dropped as duplicates of ours, and gPayoutExecQueue was not taken: gPaying is the exec queue in this tree, at finer granularity. 9. QueuePayouts signature. THEIRS for the round-proof arguments, OURS for the type of blockHash. It stays a uint256 and is converted to hex only where the round proof needs text -- a ledger key that has been through ToString() is a key that can be compared wrong. 10. Maturity policy. OURS. matureAtHeight = blockHeight + COINBASE_SPENDABLE_DEPTH (120), not + COINBASE_MATURITY (100). At depth 100 the block's own coinbase is still 20 blocks short of spendable, so the payment must come from unrelated mature coin and the pool runs a permanent float. Our own history contradicts itself here -- d6972a0 argued for COINBASE_MATURITY citing "96% of 934 payments", 44849e6 reversed it on the grounds that the measurement was taken while the node was alone on a private fork paying itself. HEAD's position is kept. This is a considered disagreement with upstream, not an oversight. The live production ledger confirms it: both entries have matureAtHeight - blockHeight = 120. 11. Comment above FlushMaturePayouts. Rewritten to describe the merged design. 12. FlushMaturePayouts, the central difference. THEIRS for the model. The ledger entry now survives on disk until every recipient has a txid, instead of being erased as soon as its payments were handed off -- the old ordering left a window where the debt was described by nothing at all, and a container restart on 2026-07-30 silently dropped ~1,156 BTF through it. Our gPaying is kept on top as the in-flight working set, because it carries the per-recipient retry and deferral state a per-round nextAttempt cannot express. It is explicitly a cache derived from the ledger, not a second record of debt: if it were lost the next flush would rebuild it. 13. PayoutThreadFn, 79 vs 70 lines. OURS for the loop and the reorg re-check, THEIRS for the per-recipient dedupe. The re-check on every attempt is load-bearing and upstream has no equivalent -- it decides once, at maturity, and a payment can sit through hours of retries during which the reorg that kills its funding block can land. Their paidTxids check is taken, against the ledger rather than against the batch. Our deferral policy is kept: waiting for coin is not a failure and must not consume the retry budget. Two fixes upstream does not have are folded in here rather than deferred to a follow-up commit: - FindRecordedPoolPayout runs once per record, on its first attempt, not on every attempt. It is a linear scan of mapWallet under cs_mapWallet, per recipient; upstream repeats it for every retry, which with 2000 rotating payout addresses and a budget of 1440 retries is a full wallet scan per address per minute for a day. The question it answers can only change across a restart, and every restart re-arms the flag. - The ledger file write no longer happens under gPayoutLedgerMutex in the per-recipient loop. SavePendingPayoutsLocked was split into a serialise step that needs the lock and a write step that does not, so the mutex is held only long enough to read the structure. The orphan scan in FlushMaturePayouts was likewise restructured so the ledger mutex is not held across PayoutBlockStillOnChain's cs_main acquisition. One case the merged model created and neither side handled: under survives-until-fully-paid, our GIVING UP path dropped the in-flight record but left the recipient owed in the ledger forever, so every later flush would explode it again -- a forfeit that silently becomes an infinite retry. ForfeitPayoutRecipient writes the amount off so the entry can retire. 14. QueuePayouts call site. Follow-on of 9. 15. ThreadRPCServer startup. BOTH. LoadPoolRounds added; LoadPaying and ReconcilePayouts stay, and stay before the payout thread starts. Crash safety, stated as the property that must hold: after kill -9 at any point, restart pays each recipient exactly once. Before SendMoney, the ledger has no txid and the payment is retried. Between SendMoney and the ledger write, the wallet holds the transaction and the first-attempt probe finds it. After the ledger write, paidTxids suppresses it. If the in-flight file is lost entirely, the ledger rebuilds it and the probe still covers the middle window. src/nostr.cpp -- 3 hunks. THEIRS as the base, with two things restored from ours. Theirs loads the Windows ROOT certificate store, which ours lacks and genuinely needs, since OpenSSL's default verify paths are usually empty there and our version would fail closed. But the plan's claim that theirs is a superset of our 06bceb4 is FALSE: upstream's nostr.cpp contains no min_proto_version, no TLS1_2, no SSL_OP_NO_*, and no set_options anywhere, so taking it wholesale would have removed the TLS-version floor outright. Restored. Second, their SSL_get_verify_result check sits after a successful handshake, where with SSL_VERIFY_PEER set it is nearly dead code -- a bad certificate aborts inside SSL_connect. The reporting belongs in the failure branch, which is where the merge put it; their post-handshake duplicate was dropped. Our relay-list and socket-pooling hunks auto-merged and were verified intact. src/net.cpp -- 1 hunk. THEIRS. Their guard, hSocket == INVALID_SOCKET || pnode->hSocket != hSocket, subsumes ours and additionally catches descriptor recycling, which ours did not; our version also referenced a pnode that only existed in the select() loop. Our other db34011 hunk, nulling pnode->hSocket in the poll-failure branch, auto-merged and was NOT re-applied -- plan section 7 Batch D says to re-apply it, and that instruction is stale. Two pieces of residue the merge left behind were cleaned up: a comment still describing select() semantics, and a pnode->hSocket != INVALID_SOCKET guard made redundant by a continue two lines above it. src/main.cpp -- 2 hunks. h1 BOTH, pure add/add adjacency between our ParticipantHashThreadCount and their SecureClear forward declarations. h2 OURS, and their handler discarded: 44004e3 no-ops checkorder/submitorder but keeps market.cpp and market.h, whereas 11766be deletes the marketplace outright including CRequestTracker, subscribe/publish and mapProducts. Ours is strictly more. src/main_gui.cpp -- 2 hunks. BOTH, additive on both sides. Our /payoutaddr, /payoutfile and /hashthreads alongside their /stratumbridge and /stratumbridgeport. src/btfrv.cpp -- 1 hunk, not predicted by the plan. False adjacency: our INVALID_SOCKET check and their #endif landed at the same offset. Ordering is load-bearing -- our check goes inside the #else arm, before the #endif, or the non-proxy build silently loses it. The BITFLASH_NODE_BUILD arm already returns early, so both paths now have the check. Makefile -- 2 hunks plus a hazard with no conflict marker. THEIRS for both dependency-fetch recipes: checkout --detach FETCH_HEAD followed by test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$(..._COMMIT)" asserts the pin actually landed, where ours only checked it out. Everything of ours that they lack is kept: the appimagetool 1.9.1 release pin with a sha256 check, where upstream fetches the mutable "continuous" tag and executes it undigested, and the move of both the tool and the AppDir out of /tmp, where any local user could pre-place an executable and have it run as whoever runs make. The hazard: both sides added a pin block in a different place, so git merged both, outside any conflict region. SECP256K1_COMMIT and RANDOMX_COMMIT ended up assigned twice, near L16 and near L44, and GNU Make takes the last := -- a naive resolution would have silently built against our old secp256k1 pin while appearing to adopt upstream's. The duplicate block was deleted by hand. Each of the four variables is now assigned exactly once, and make -n resolves SECP256K1_COMMIT to 7fecac74 with 6e2c8bc4 appearing nowhere. Also applied here, from plan phase 4: SECP256K1_COMMIT moved to upstream's 7fecac74aed8e1fd9078380d67dd04663705c989 so signature validation matches the binaries the rest of the network runs. secp256k1 was rebuilt from scratch against the new pin on the build host and the checked-out dependency commit verified. RANDOMX_COMMIT already matched at 1e9d4b2d and is unchanged. src/Makefile, src/makefile.mingw -- 1 hunk each, both the HEADERS list. Ours drops market.h, theirs adds proxy.h; the resolution does both. Taking theirs wholesale would have left the Makefiles referencing a header git had already deleted in our favour, silently, without a conflict. Files the plan predicted would conflict and did not: net.h, main.h and db.cpp auto-merged. Verified rather than assumed. net.h carries both our BTF_MSG_WAIT_MAX_SECS work, including the constructor fix from 2d84982 that starts nMsgWaitSince and nMsgWaitSize at 0, and their comment rewrite with extern int nPeersWatched. The dead members that fix removed are gone from every file. Deviations from MERGE-1.2.18-PLAN.md. - Section 6's mechanism was not used. Replayed onto the real merge base and merged, rather than cherry-picking onto the tag. Same result, 28 hunks instead of 51. - Section 2 calls 09ff575 a superset of our 06bceb4. It is not; upstream has no TLS-version floor at all. Ours restored on top of theirs. - Section 7 Batch D says to re-apply our db34011 line into their poll-failure branch. It auto-merged; re-applying would have duplicated it. - Section 2 says do not take the stratum bridge. It is taken, and left off. fStratumBridge defaults false in main.cpp, the thread is only spawned when /stratumbridge is passed, and the listener binds 127.0.0.1 only. Excising it would cost real divergence and future conflict for no gain while it is disabled. Its defects -- select()/FD_SET on a node that can hold more than 1024 descriptors, and an uncapped thread per connection -- are real only when it is enabled and are being reported upstream separately. - Section 7's staged batches were not run as separate gated commits. The conflict surface is interleaved within single functions, chiefly the payout ledger, and splitting it would have meant committing states that do not build. The merge is one commit, as briefed. - Batch F's two fixes are folded into hunk 13 rather than deferred, because they change the same lines the resolution rewrites. - The plan did not anticipate the btfrv.cpp conflict, the duplicate pin block, the market.h trap in the two Makefiles, or the give-up/infinite-retry interaction created by adopting upstream's ledger model.

mine: one pool session in participant mode, not one per core

2026-08-23T04:37:36+00:00

StartMinerThreads() sizes its pool with MinerThreadCount(), which is right for solo mining -- each thread hashes a template of its own -- and wrong for participant mode, where every thread entering BitcoinMiner() is a whole miner: its own Stratum session, its own payout address off the rotation, its own pool of /hashthreads workers. The two counts multiplied instead of dividing. Measured on the pool box with /hashthreads=2: a container with no cpuset logged "Mining with 11 thread(s) of 12 core(s)" -- 11 sessions, 22 hash threads on 12 cores, 1058% CPU, load 22.68 -- while the same binary under --cpuset-cpus 10,11 logged one session and 199%. The second miner (8 cores, /hashthreads=1) ran 7 sessions and went 74C to 89C. No code differed between those runs. Only the cpuset did, which means the cpuset was holding the thread count down by accident and every deployment without one was oversubscribed. Participant mode now starts exactly one session, so /hashthreads means what it says instead of being multiplied by the core count. The worker count moves to ParticipantHashThreadCount(), next to MinerThreadCount() where the two are easy to confuse, so what is printed at startup and what actually hashes cannot drift apart -- and it IS printed now. It was only ever visible under -debug, which is how eleven sessions ran unnoticed. Same host, same cpuset (0-3), same arguments, measured as a delta over 20 s more than four minutes after start: before 399% CPU, 6-7 threads hot, 3 sessions after 201% CPU, exactly 2 threads at 99.9%, 1 session Solo mining is untouched: /gen without /participant still starts MinerThreadCount() threads. (cherry picked from commit 45bc9ed5bc132712092f3e7902fef746c6cae898)

net: stop serving the 2009 marketplace to anonymous peers

2026-08-23T04:37:36+00:00

Four inherited handlers took attacker-controlled input and wrote to disk with nothing authorising it. None of them had a caller left anywhere in the tree, so all four were reachable only from the outside. checkorder called GenerateNewKey() -- AddKey(), a wallet.dat write -- for any peer that asked, and handed back the pubkey. Its comment claims the cache keeps one key per ip, and on a 2009 network of routable addresses it did. Not here: inbound peers arrive through a rendezvous tunnel and are tagged by BtfMarkerAddr() over three random bytes, so addr.ip is fresh every connection and the cache never hits. Reconnect in a loop and the node mints a key per connection, none of them in any backup taken beforehand, which for a pre-BIP32 wallet is how coins go missing. The map holding them was static and never trimmed. submitorder AddToWallet()'d a CWalletTx from any peer that sent one. It had to be a valid transaction; it did not have to be ours. review checked a signature the sender made with its own key, which proves possession and authorises nothing, then appended to reviews.dat by reading the whole vector, pushing one entry and writing it all back -- quadratic disk on an unbounded map off the socket -- then walked a link graph the same peer supplied and relayed the message to every other node. reply dispatched into CRequestTracker. Nothing ever called PushRequest, so the table was permanently empty and the handler was a parser and nothing else. Removed with the subsystem behind them: market.cpp, CProduct, CReview, CUser, CReviewDB, the advert publish templates and the subscribe channel machinery, none of which had an inbound handler either. MSG_REVIEW, MSG_PRODUCT and MSG_TABLE stay in the inv enum, unserved: CInv puts type on the wire as an integer and MSG_TX and MSG_BLOCK are shared with every other node. Unknown commands are already ignored for extensibility, so peers still running these lose nothing but an answer they never asked for. Verified by a clean build of bitflash-node. (cherry picked from commit ad9c393866c007a115f32d70a9017ce91066a7d1)

size thread pools by the cores we are allowed, not the ones the host has

2026-08-23T04:37:36+00:00

std::thread::hardware_concurrency() reports the MACHINE's core count. Inside a container that is the wrong number: with --cpuset-cpus 0-5 on a 12-core host it still answers 12, and every caller that sized a pool from it oversubscribed 2x. Measured on the pool box: - the pool node logged "Mining with 11 thread(s) of 12 core(s)" while confined to 6 CPUs - a burst miner launched with /hashthreads=2 filled the ~2 GB RandomX dataset with 12 threads, alongside the pool node in the same 8 GB container AvailableCoreCount() asks sched_getaffinity what the cpuset actually permits, which is the number all of these meant. It cannot make the dataset build slower: the CPU budget is identical either way, so fewer threads on the same cores is the same work without the thrash. Falls back to hardware_concurrency where the call is unavailable, and never returns 0 because callers subtract from it. Not the cause of the burst miner dying -- that was a corrupt Berkeley DB environment in the worker datadir -- but it is why the failure landed on the dataset build, and it is wrong on its own terms. (cherry picked from commit b3bee16f3eef8982bff1174bd9d0a9c21473732c)