1 files changed, 3 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/21.md b/21.md
index 0559007..c5d80ed 100644
--- a/21.md
+++ b/21.md
@@ -43,8 +43,7 @@ Ids and signatures omitted and pubkeys shortened for readability.
 [^q1]: https://t.me/nostr_protocol/26059
-Rationale
+## Rationale
---------
 [NIP-04](04.md) is flawed because its event contents are encrypted, but the metadata around it is not, and by the nature of Nostr as a protocol designed for public communication in general anyone is able to query relays for any event they want -- thus it's possible to anyone to track conversations between any other Nostr users, not _exactly what_ they're saying, but to whom they're chatting and how often.
@@ -59,8 +58,7 @@ This NIP, if used in conjunction with relays that are trusted to honor it and no
 [^1]: Not considering, of course, the million other features Telegram offers, that are irrelevant to this document.
 [^2]: Not considering, of course, the cryptographic protocols that Signal uses to provide forward secrecy and other advanced functionality which are already not present in NIP-04.
-Comparison with other proposals
+## Comparison with other proposals
-------------------------------
 Over the last months a number of other proposals were made to try to improve the lack of privacy NIP-04 provides[^3][^4][^5].
@@ -75,8 +73,7 @@ Although all these proposals solve the issue in some way of another, and it can
 [^6]: For example, even with ephemeral keys, if the general public still have access to all the events some time-analyses and other heuristics can be used to try to track chat activity between Nostr users.
 [^7]: Another example: even with ephemeral keys, it can be assumed that relays will know at least the IP address of the clients that are using it for the kind-4 messages, so they will have almost as much metadata as before -- which brings us back, again, to some level of trust on these relays to not reveal this metadata to the public, as in the current proposal.
-Further possibilities
+## Further possibilities
---------------------
 Some random things that can be optionally done based on this NIP:

diff --git a/21.md b/21.md index 0559007..c5d80ed 100644 --- a/21.md +++ b/21.md
@@ -43,8 +43,7 @@ Ids and signatures omitted and pubkeys shortened for readability.
43		43
44	[^q1]: https://t.me/nostr_protocol/26059	44	[^q1]: https://t.me/nostr_protocol/26059
45		45
46	Rationale	46	## Rationale
47	---------
48		47
49	[NIP-04](04.md) is flawed because its event contents are encrypted, but the metadata around it is not, and by the nature of Nostr as a protocol designed for public communication in general anyone is able to query relays for any event they want -- thus it's possible to anyone to track conversations between any other Nostr users, not _exactly what_ they're saying, but to whom they're chatting and how often.	48	[NIP-04](04.md) is flawed because its event contents are encrypted, but the metadata around it is not, and by the nature of Nostr as a protocol designed for public communication in general anyone is able to query relays for any event they want -- thus it's possible to anyone to track conversations between any other Nostr users, not _exactly what_ they're saying, but to whom they're chatting and how often.
50		49
@@ -59,8 +58,7 @@ This NIP, if used in conjunction with relays that are trusted to honor it and no
59	[^1]: Not considering, of course, the million other features Telegram offers, that are irrelevant to this document.	58	[^1]: Not considering, of course, the million other features Telegram offers, that are irrelevant to this document.
60	[^2]: Not considering, of course, the cryptographic protocols that Signal uses to provide forward secrecy and other advanced functionality which are already not present in NIP-04.	59	[^2]: Not considering, of course, the cryptographic protocols that Signal uses to provide forward secrecy and other advanced functionality which are already not present in NIP-04.
61		60
62	Comparison with other proposals	61	## Comparison with other proposals
63	-------------------------------
64		62
65	Over the last months a number of other proposals were made to try to improve the lack of privacy NIP-04 provides[^3][^4][^5].	63	Over the last months a number of other proposals were made to try to improve the lack of privacy NIP-04 provides[^3][^4][^5].
66		64
@@ -75,8 +73,7 @@ Although all these proposals solve the issue in some way of another, and it can
75	[^6]: For example, even with ephemeral keys, if the general public still have access to all the events some time-analyses and other heuristics can be used to try to track chat activity between Nostr users.	73	[^6]: For example, even with ephemeral keys, if the general public still have access to all the events some time-analyses and other heuristics can be used to try to track chat activity between Nostr users.
76	[^7]: Another example: even with ephemeral keys, it can be assumed that relays will know at least the IP address of the clients that are using it for the kind-4 messages, so they will have almost as much metadata as before -- which brings us back, again, to some level of trust on these relays to not reveal this metadata to the public, as in the current proposal.	74	[^7]: Another example: even with ephemeral keys, it can be assumed that relays will know at least the IP address of the clients that are using it for the kind-4 messages, so they will have almost as much metadata as before -- which brings us back, again, to some level of trust on these relays to not reveal this metadata to the public, as in the current proposal.
77		75
78	Further possibilities	76	## Further possibilities
79	---------------------
80		77
81	Some random things that can be optionally done based on this NIP:	78	Some random things that can be optionally done based on this NIP:
82		79